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The European External Action Service is now a reality, though a 
genuine common EU foreign policy has receded into the distance. 
The  member  states  are  simply  afraid  of  surrendering  their 
sovereignty in this area. After a seemingly endless debate about 
the composition of the EEAS, it is now time for some hard thinking 
in conceptual and strategic terms about how the service can be 
beneficial for both the member states and the EU as a whole. 
The  Treaty  of  Lisbon  was  supposed  to 
enable the EU to face up to the challenges 
of the 21st century in the area of foreign 
and security policy. However, a feeling of 
despondency  is  beginning  to  make  itself 
felt only seven months after it entered into 
force. Nothing has changed when it comes 
to  the  image  that  the  EU  is  an  economic 
giant and a dwarf in foreign policy terms. 
Furthermore,  as  a  result  of  the  financial 
and economic crisis Europe is also on the 
verge  of  collapse  as  a  global  economic 
power.  
 
It  is  thus  rather  difficult  to  understand 
why  the  EU,  in  this  precarious  situation, 
seems  to  prefer  to  engage  in  debilitating 
internal  strife  instead  of  marshalling  its 
forces  in  the  shape  of  a  new  foreign  and 
security policy architecture that might be 
capable of producing results in the sphere 
of external policy. 
 
I 
A New Office, But  
No New Dynamism 
The important institutional innovations of 
the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  include  the  office  of 
High  Representative  of  the  Union  for 
Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  and 
Vice  President  of  the  Commission  (HR) 
and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), which is under the control of the 
HR and is supposed to support him in his 
endeavours.  This  newly  created  office  
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means that in foreign policy the EU will be 
represented  by  one  person,  and  not  by 
two,  as  has  hitherto  been  the  case.  It 
combines  the  posts  previously  held  by 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner 
for  External  Relations,  and  Javier  Solana, 
the Council’s foreign policy appointee. 
 
At first sight this seems like a good thing. 
After all, it reduces the number of foreign 
policy players in the EU who are jockeying 
for  position.  There  is  nonetheless  little 
reason for rejoicing. For in view of the fact 
that  we  have  the  President  of  the  EU,  a 
post  also  newly  created  by  the  Treaty  of 
Lisbon,  the  President  of  the  Commission 
with  growing  ambitions  in  the  field  of 
foreign policy, the commissioners involved 
in  the  area  of  external  trade,  the  27 
member  states,  the  rotating  EU 
Presidency, and the many special envoys, 
it  is  clear  that  there  are  still  enough 
players out on the field in order to confuse 
friend and foe alike.  
 
It  is  of  course  true  that  the  Treaty  of 
Lisbon  has  created  new  offices  and 
institutions, but otherwise everything that 
is of crucial importance is actually still the 
same. The EU has not witnessed systemic 
change.  Foreign  and  security  policy 
continues to be solely in the hands of the 
member states, and all important decisions 
still  have  to  be  taken  unanimously.  As  a 
result  the  dual  structure  consisting  of 
Council  and  Commission  continues  to 
exist,  in  which  the  Council,  the 
organization which represents the member 
states,  is  responsible  for  the  Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
Common  European  Security  and  Defence 
Policy (CESDP), and at the same time the 
European  Commission  is  responsible  for 
(in  foreign  policy  terms)  the  equally 
important  tasks  of  enlargement  and 
neighbourhood policy, development policy 
and  humanitarian  aid,  and,  last  but  not 
least, trade policy. 
 
The  new  office  is  a  makeshift  structure, 
and  perhaps  even  a  deceitful  one  which 
tries to disguise the fact that in the Treaty 
of Lisbon the member states were unable 
to  reach  agreement  on  whether  or  not 
foreign  and  security  policy  should  be  a 
communitarized task. Their fears of losing 
sovereignty were so great that it was not 
even  possible  to  use  the  term  Foreign 
Minister. Thus the complete title is just as 
ungainly and clumsy as the new structure. 
The  image  of  a  “double  hat”  now 
commonly  used  to  describe  it  actually 
conceals  what  the  incumbent  is  really 
going  to  be  asked  to  do.  He  must 
simultaneously  serve  two  masters,  the 
Commission and the Council. The two are 
worlds  apart,  and  they  are  separated  not 
only by the Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat. 
 
The  EEAS  forms  the  substructure  for  the 
HR’s activities. In analogy to the HR’s two 
“hats,” the service will combine under one 
umbrella  those  departments  for  foreign 
relations      which  have  hitherto  been 
assigned  to  the  Commission  (Directorate 
General  RELEX  and  parts  of  the 
Directorate General for Development) and 
the  Council  (Policy  Unit,  Directorate 
General E, ESDP structures). In addition to 
this  the  representative  offices  which  the 
Commission  maintains  in  more  than  135 
states in the world are being transferred to 
the  new  service  to  serve  as  its  future 
outposts.  It  is  also  taking  over  the  EU 
representations  at  international 
organizations. Up to a third of the staff of 
the  EEAS  (in  addition  to  civil  servants 
from the Council and the Commission) will 
consist  of  diplomats  from  the  member 
states, who will have the same rights and 
duties as their colleagues from the Council 
and the Commission. 
 
II 
Lady Ashton and Her 
Opponents 
Lady  Ashton  was  chosen  to  be  the  first 
incumbent  to  wear  the  “double  hat.”  Her 
central task was to set up, at the behest of 
the  European  Council,  an  establishment 
plan  for  the  diplomatic  service  which  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
#
 
2
0
1
0
/
0
5
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
 
 
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
 
3
 
comprises  the  budget,  staffing  provisions 
and  service  regulations.  The  EEAS  enters 
into force through a unanimous decision of 
the  European  Council  after  coordination 
with  the  Commission  and  consultation 
with  the  European  Parliament  (EP). 
However, the EEAS can only begin to work 
after  a  series  of  regulations  which  are 
required  for  it  to  function  have  been 
modified.  They  include  the  staff 
regulations  for  EEAS  employees  and  a 
budget  of  its  own.  Here  the  EP  is  on  an 
equal legislative footing with the Council. 
 
Going  by  the  plans  drawn  up  by  the 
Swedish  Presidency,  the  EEAS  should 
already  have  been  in  a  position  to  start 
work  in  April  2010.  That  it  was  not 
possible  to  adhere  to  this  timetable  is 
hardly  surprising.  The  provisions  in  the 
Treaty  are  of  a  very  general  kind.  This 
means there is room for interpretation, or, 
to put it another way, this has paved the 
way  for  intrigues  and  power  struggles 
within  the  EU  bureaucracy  and  between 
Brussels  and  the  national  capitals.  Lady 
Ashton  soon  became  aware  of  this,  and 
from  the  very  first  day  came  up  against 
opposition  from  all  sides.  Since  then  she 
has  been  weathering  the  storm  of  the 
structural  tensions  between  the  Council 
and  the  Commission  that  are  implicit  in 
her post and in the EEAS. And the EP, the 
rights of which have been enhanced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, has also used the EEAS 
in  order  to  increase  its  influence  on 
foreign policy.  
 
III 
The Commission.  
Divide and Rule 
President  of  the  Commission  Barroso 
struck the first blow against the EEAS. He 
alone is responsible for the content of his 
commissioners’ portfolios, and he decided 
to  move  the  important  foreign  policy 
dossier for Neighbourhood Policy from the 
Commissioner  for  External  Relations, 
where it had been located in the previous 
Commission,  to  the  Commissioner  for 
Enlargement.  All  those  who  had  thought 
that the new HR would be able to take over 
exactly  those  tasks  which  had  been 
assigned  to  the  former  Commissioner  for 
External  Relations  had  to  think  again.  In 
fact what Barroso was telling the member 
states  and  the  Council  was  quite 
unambiguous.  The  Commission  was  not 
and is not prepared to hand over (or in its 
eyes  to  surrender)  its  foreign  policy 
responsibilities  to  the  EEAS.  It  wants  to 
continue  to  play  an  independent  role  in 
the EU’s foreign relations. 
 
This  move  was  actually  frowned  upon  by 
some  of  the  most  integration-friendly 
observers.  The  Commission,  unlike  the 
Council,  has  the  advantage  of  not  being 
subject  to  the  constraints  imposed  by 
unanimity.  Nevertheless  it  is  not 
noticeably faster and more flexible in the 
foreign  policy  area  for  which  it  bears 
responsibility.  It  should  always  be  borne 
in  mind  that  the  Commission  is  a 
bureaucracy.  Thus  its  foreign  policy 
instruments  consist  of  programmes 
reminiscent of treaties in which goals and 
supportive  measures  are  negotiated 
between  it  and  its  third  countries  and 
agreed on for longer periods of time. This 
robs the Commission of  the possibility of 
adopting a different approach on a  short-
term  basis  if  and  when  the  situation 
makes it seem apposite, and of reassigning 
financial  assistance  or  taking  it  away. 
Treaty  states  which  do  not  adhere  to  the 
provisions for good governance or trample 
on human rights do not really have to be 
afraid  that  the  EU  will  punish  them  by 
withholding  aid.  For  this  reason  many 
people had high hopes of the EEAS. There 
were expectations that it might be able to 
mark a shift to a greater degree of political 
management. 
 
However, in the case of non-governmental 
organizations  which  are  involved  in 
development work, the Commission gained 
broad support for its attempts to shield its 
dossiers  from  the  EEAS.  In  widespread 
campaigns  the  NGOs  made  it  clear  that  
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whatever  happened  they  wished  to  keep 
development  cooperation  work  separate 
from  the  EEAS,  and  gained  many 
supporters  for  their  views  in  the  EP. 
Unlike  fears  that  the  Commission’s 
bureaucratic  approach  would  deprive  the 
EU of opportunities to exert its influence, 
these  organizations  were  afraid  that  via 
the  EEAS  and  the  HR  the  member  states 
might  be  tempted  to  politicize 
development work and that this would put 
its real and most important goal, which is 
to combat poverty, on the back burner. 
 
In  the  final  analysis  this  conflict  is  all 
about  a  great  deal  of  money  and  the 
question  of  who  can  disburse  it.  The 
Commission  spends  about  €12  billion 
annually on its programmes in the areas of 
conflict  prevention,  human  rights 
protection,  promotion  of  democracy  and 
development  policy  in  the  broader  sense, 
and  this  does  not  include  pre-accession 
assistance  and  financial  support  for  pre-
accession  strategies.  Compared  with  this 
the  budget  of  the  Council  for  the 
CFSP/CESDP,  which  amounts  to  €250 
million  annually,  seems  rather  paltry. 
Originally  the  strategic  planning  for  the 
disbursement  of  funds  for  these 
programmes was to have been assigned to 
the HR, and in this scheme of things the 
Commission  would  merely  have  been 
responsible for the implementation of the 
programmes.  The  HR  was  to  have  been 
able to decide how much money was going 
to  be  spent  on  what  on  the  basis  of  the 
political  priorities.  This  would  have  been 
in  keeping  with  the  nature  of  the  office 
and  the  goal  of  trying  to  achieve  greater 
coherence and a strategic use of resources 
in  foreign  policy.  However,  these  plans 
have  been  jettisoned.  Suspicions  that  the 
member  states  might  introduce  a  re-
nationalization  of  the  Commission’s 
community  programmes  by  way  of  the 
“double  hat”  were  simply  too  great.  The 
fact that the HR is also Vice President of 
the  Commission  and  thus  duty-bound  in 
Commission  matters  to  apply  the 
Community  method  was  not  deemed  to 
offer sufficient protection. For this reason 
the  EEAS  will  be  carrying  out  the 
programming  of  the  appropriate  financial 
instruments  at  the  behest  of  the 
Commissioner  concerned  and  under  his 
supervision.  Lady  Ashton  was  forced  to 
agree to this. Her far-reaching concessions 
to the Commission mean that basically the 
status quo ante has been restored. The HR 
will  only  participate  in  the  strategic 
planning  and  only  become  involved  in  a 
coordinating  capacity.  Disputed  decisions 
will  be  referred  to  the  Commissioners’ 
college. And in any case, the President of 
the Commission will have the final word. 
 
IV 
The Council.  
We Are Simply Better 
The  Council,  which  functions  as  the 
representative  of  the  member  states  in 
Brussels,  showed  little  sign  of  any 
willingness to enhance the EU’s image as 
a global player with the help of a compact 
and  efficiently  organized  EEAS.  Calls  to 
dismantle tiresome dual structures in the 
Council and Commission, and the wish to 
enhance the EU’s voice and external clout 
have also remained mere lip service.  
 
Lady  Ashton  was  greeted  with  great 
scepticism. When all is said and done, she 
comes from the Commission camp, where, 
before her appointment to the post of HR, 
she worked as Commissioner for Trade for 
almost a year. That she set up her office in 
the Commission is  interpreted as another 
sign  of  her  predilection  for  the 
Commission. Quite a few people turned up 
their  noses  at  the  foreign  policy 
inexperience of their new boss. However, 
they  deliberately  seem  to  be  overlooking 
the fact that it was precisely this  lack of 
experience  which  made  her  so  attractive 
for  the  heads  of  state  and  government  of 
the  member  states.  After  all,  in  her  case 
the  member  states  did  not  have  to  be 
afraid that she would eclipse them in the 
international arena. 
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Be that as it may, it certainly seemed as if 
the  Council  was  doing  everything  in  its 
power  to  ensure  that  nothing  would 
change  as  a  result  of  the  forthcoming 
transfer  of  the  Council  departments 
concerned to the EEAS. In this respect one 
was  not  going  to  be  outdone  by  the 
Commission.  Even  before  Lady  Ashton 
could  present  her  first  personal  draft 
proposals relating to the EEAS, the Council 
confronted  her  with  a  fait  accompli  and 
unveiled  a  new  Crisis  Management  and 
Planning  Directorate  (CMPD)  which 
combined  the  Council’s  civil  and  military 
crisis  reaction  instruments.  The  Council 
intends to transfer this  directorate to the 
EEAS as a special unit with its own staff 
regulations,  and  also  the  staff  of  the 
Civilian  Planning  and  Conduct  Capability 
(CPCC), the Military Staff of the European 
Union  (EUMS)  and  the  Situation  Centre 
(Sitcen). 
 
These  plans,  which  the  Council  managed 
to insert in the Ashton draft proposals of 
25 March 2010, immediately aroused fears 
in  the  Commission  and  the  European 
Parliament  that  the  Community  method 
would  no  longer  apply  to  the  capabilities 
set up by the Commission in the areas of 
conflict  prevention,  crisis  reaction  and 
post-conflict peace-building. The Greens in 
the EP, and with regard to this issue they 
have  the  support  of  most  of  the  other 
parties, have come out in favour of making 
the  most  of  the  opportunity  which  the 
EEAS  offers  by  adopting  a  modern  and 
comprehensive security policy. They have 
demanded against ongoing resistance from 
the  Council  that  the  corresponding 
capabilities  of  the  Commission  and  the 
Council  should  at  least  be  assembled 
under  the  umbrella  of  an  EEAS  “Peace-
building”  Directorate  General.  In  the 
meantime  the  EP  has  received  from  Lady 
Ashton  a  declaration  that  she  intends  to 
include a “peace-building” structure of this 
kind.  If  the  former  Council  and 
Commission  structures  were  to  be 
transferred  to  the  diplomatic  service 
unchanged  and  moreover  shielded  from 
one  another,  the  EEAS  would  not  have 
convincingly  demonstrated  why  it  was 
better  than  its  predecessors.  Creating  a 
new  bureaucracy  cannot  be  an  end  in 
itself.  But  as  yet  it  cannot  be  completely 
excluded  that  this  is  what  will  actually 
happen. 
 
V 
The Member States:  
Why and For What Do We 
Need the EEAS 
 
The  report  on  the  EEAS  by  the  Swedish 
Presidency  in  October  2009  precisely 
delineated  its  structure,  composition  and 
working methods, and for this reason most 
of  the  heads  of  state  and  government 
seemed  to  think  that  after  a  Yes  vote  in 
the  Irish  referendum  the  implementation 
of this plan through a draft resolution by 
the  HR  would  be  a  mere  formality.  After 
all,  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  stated  that  the 
European  Council  would  be  making  the 
decision  and  that  was  that.  The  member 
states do not seem to have reckoned with 
the  kinds  of  resistance  that  this  draft 
subsequently  encountered  both  in  the 
Commission  and  the  EP.  To  be  fair,  they 
did not exactly devote a great deal of time 
to the problems of the EEAS. As a result of 
the  financial,  economic  and  latterly  the 
debt and euro crises there have been quite 
a lot of other and more important items on 
the agenda. 
 
And on top of everything else the foreign 
ministers  seemed  to  be  slightly  offended. 
After all, they were forced to come to the 
realization  that  under  the  new  Lisbon 
regime  they  are  no  longer  going  to  be 
invited to the prestigious meetings of the 
European  Council.  This  visibly  dampened 
their enthusiasm when it came to helping 
the European Foreign and Security Policy 
to get off the ground. 
 
However, the reasons for the scant interest 
in  the  EEAS  which  was  displayed  in  the  
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EU capitals go much deeper than offended 
vanity or fear of the competition to which 
the EEAS could subject the diplomats of a 
member  state.  It  is  a  reflection  of  the 
fundamentally  ambivalent  attitude  to  the 
EU’s  foreign  and  security  policy 
architecture as introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon.  Somehow  it  seems  that  in  the 
years of tough and protracted negotiations 
and  the  never-ending  ratification  process 
it  has  been  forgotten  why  people  wanted 
this reform in the first place. The fact that 
Europe can survive in a rapidly changing 
world only if it finds common responses to 
increasingly  complex  challenges  has  not 
played a role in the disputes surrounding 
the EEAS, nor has the fact that China and 
India,  two  extremely  self-confident 
countries,  are  on  the  brink  of  decisively 
changing  the  balance  of  power  in 
international relations. The reverse is true. 
Hitherto  the  debate  about  the  EEAS  has 
excluded  strategic  thinking  of  any  kind. 
How the EEAS has to be structured so that 
it can serve the interests of the Europeans 
in the international framework and under 
what  for  them  are  increasingly  difficult 
conditions  seems  to  be  of  no  interest 
whatsoever.  And  people  are  obviously 
more  concerned  to  protect  their  own 
sinecures.  A  department  for  strategic 
planning  was  included  in  the 
organizational chart of the EEAS only as a 
result of pressure from the EP. 
 
For  a  long  time  the  only  thing  that 
emanated  from  the  German  government 
with  regard  to  the  EEAS  was  a  message 
from  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to 
Lady  Ashton  which  contained  a  demand 
for the use of German as an official EEAS 
language.  In  the  United  Kingdom  the 
EEAS,  as  might  have  been  expected,  has 
few  supporters.  The  British  had  already 
made  it  clear  in  the  Lisbon  negotiations 
that  they  are  not  prepared  to  make  the 
slightest concessions with regard to their 
sovereignty  as  it  pertains  to  foreign, 
security and defence policy questions. The 
British  revised  text  of  the  Ashton 
proposals  was  correspondingly 
uncompromising.  A  mutual  duty  to  share 
information between EEAS embassies and 
national  embassies  was  deleted,  as  was 
the idea of enabling the EEAS to perform 
consular functions in non-EU states. Here 
the  British  prevailed  over  the  smaller 
member  states.  In  view  of  their  own 
restricted possibilities, they saw the EEAS 
as an opportunity on the one hand to save 
money,  and  on  the  other  to  be  able  to 
continue  to  exert  influence  in  the  future. 
Finally the EEAS creates quite a few new 
top jobs in the EU delegations throughout 
the  world.  It  stands  to  reason  that  it  is 
more  attractive  for  a  Maltese  diplomat  to 
be at the head of the EU embassy in China 
than  to  be  the  ambassador  of  Malta  in 
China.  For  this  reason  the  smaller 
countries focused on the question of how it 
might  be  possible  to  prevent  the  large 
member  states  from  passing  over  their 
diplomats  when  it  came  to  making 
appointments.  They  asked  to  be  given  a 
quorum,  though  this  is  something  they 
failed to achieve. However, at their behest 
the draft resolution contains a remark that 
the  composition  of  the  EEAS  should  be 
balanced in geographical terms. 
 
As far as one could see, the French were 
the only people who were really in favour 
of the EEAS, and they did what they could 
to  impress  their  stamp  on  its  structure. 
Thus the omnipotent Secretary General at 
the  head  of  the  service  was  obviously 
inspired by French models. The influence 
of  France  could  also  be  discerned  in  the 
attempts to transfer the Council’s civil and 
in  particular  its  military  crisis  reaction 
structures to the EEAS in largely shielded 
form.  This  naturally  did  not  happen  for 
altruistic reasons, since a Frenchwoman is 
at  the  head  of  this  structure.  Whereas 
Germany remained largely passive, it was 
impossible not to gain the impression that 
the  French,  to  paraphrase  Clausewitz, 
were pursuing European foreign policy in 
terms  of  national  foreign  policy  with  an 
admixture  of  European  resources.  This 
suggests that the French will be in favour 
of the EEAS as long as it is a vehicle for 
French ambitions. 
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VI 
The EP. Asking Too Much? 
 
The EP entered the fray brandishing a wild 
card. It is of course true that it merely has 
to be consulted before a decision is taken 
to  establish  the  EEAS.  But  it  is  on  a  par 
with  the  Council  with  regard  to  any 
legislative  amendments  that  may  be 
required  to  set  up  the  EEAS.  The  EP  has 
made use of its right to veto. Thus it was 
at  loggerheads  from  the  very  beginning 
with  the  member  states  and  to  some 
extent with the Commission with regard to 
all  the  important  issues.  The  EP  did  not 
want to set up the EEAS as an independent 
institution with a budget of its own and its 
own staff regulations, and was in favour of 
putting  it  under  the  aegis  of  the 
Commission.  Among  the  players  in  this 
game  of  poker,  the  EP  at  least  wished  to 
remind all the participants of the final goal 
of  European  integration.  If  one  was 
striving  for  “an  ever  closer  union  among 
the  peoples  of  Europe,”  it  meant  a 
progressive  communitarization  of  foreign 
and security policy. 
 
Another bone of contention is the question 
of  who  is  permitted  to  deputize  for  Lady 
Ashton. The EP did not like the Secretary 
General  model  at  the  head  of  the  EEAS, 
and  in  the  draft  proposals  submitted  by 
Lady Ashton in March it seemed that the 
EP was going to be fobbed off with one of 
his deputies who was responsible only for 
administrative  questions.  But  the  EP 
insisted  that  in  matters  to  do  with  the 
Commission  it  would  only  communicate 
with the corresponding Commissioners as 
deputies  of  the  HR.  In  the  case  of  the 
CFSP/CESDP  it  called  for  special 
appointees  on  the  lines  of  the  German 
minister of state. The powerful position of 
the  Secretary  General  was  also  too  much 
as far as some of the member states were 
concerned.  This  post  will  not  include  the 
power to act as a deputy externally. Thus 
the EP will be getting commissioners, but 
not ministers of state. The foreign minister 
of  the  incumbent  of  the  rotating 
presidency,  who  had  already  been 
discarded,  is  being  resuscitated  as  CFSP 
deputy. 
 
The  guardians  of  the  EP  budget  were 
primarily aghast at the prospect of a new 
mega- bureaucracy  with  a  staff  of  almost 
8,000 and an annual budget of its own of 
€8 billion which was largely beyond their 
control. Hitherto only the Commission has 
been  able  to  implement  the  EU  budget, 
and  in  this  it  is  subject  to  parliamentary 
control  by  the  EP.  For  this  reason  the 
latter  demanded  amendments  and 
additional  assurances.  How  national 
diplomats in the EU delegations, who leave 
the  EEAS  after  four  years,  can  be  held 
accountable  for  their  actions  was  one  of 
the  most  controversial  issues.  Hitherto 
every  Commission  civil  servant  who  is 
given financial power of attorney has to be 
specially  trained  and  is  personally  liable 
in  cases  of  malfeasance.  This  does  not 
mean that many millions are currently not 
being squandered through negligence and 
fraud.  But  as  a  result  of  the  EEAS  these 
losses  might  be  much  greater,  and  press 
reports  about  extravagance  and 
embezzlement might start to pile up. Thus 
the  EP  had  a  point  when  it  warned  of  a 
further  threat  to  the  image  of  the  EU 
among  the  electorate.  Yet  here  the  EP  is 
fighting an increasingly solitary battle. In 
the  meantime  its  own  image  is  about  to 
suffer because it is holding up the EEAS. 
The  Commission  and  the  member  states 
wanted to use the creation of the EEAS to 
demonstrate  that  they  are  certainly 
capable  of  taking  action.  For  this  reason 
there was mounting pressure on the EP to 
terminate  its  opposition,  and  it  seems 
likely  that  the  Belgian  Presidency,  which 
begins in July, will no longer – at least as 
regards the main decision - have to worry 
about the EEAS.  
 
The  tug-of-war  surrounding  the  EEAS 
lasted for seven months, and no one really 
came out on top. It is true, of course, that 
the Commission gave nothing away, but it  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
#
 
2
0
1
0
/
0
5
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
 
 
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
p
a
g
e
 
8
 
has  not  been  able  to  prove  that  another 
bout of bureaucracy in the area of foreign 
policy is good for Europe, and presumably 
will not be able to prove it either. The EP 
wanted  a  great  deal,  and  it  wanted  the 
right  kind  of  things,  and  managed  to  get 
its way in certain areas. However, the EP’s 
central demand, which was that the EEAS 
should  be  assigned  to  the  Commission, 
was clearly asking for too much, especially 
since  it  was  easy  to  blame  it  for  the 
delays. 
 
In  the  member  states  the  foreign 
ministries  themselves  have  been 
consigned more and more to the sidelines 
and  the  heads  of  state  and  government 
have  taken  things  into  their  own  hands. 
But  they  seem  to  be  farther  away  than 
ever  from  embracing  the  EEAS.  Yet  that 
would be a significant precondition if it is 
going  to  be  a  success.  But  on  the  other 
hand they have not managed to show how 
each  acting  on  his  own  can  still  make  a 
difference in the international arena. It is 
clearly  a  drawback  that  when  the  EEAS 
was  introduced,  conceptual  and  strategic 
ideas on how the service can be beneficial 
for both the member states and the EU as 
a whole were not deemed to be important. 
There  is  no  mission  statement.  Whether 
the service will tend to place the emphasis 
on  classical  diplomacy  or  whether  it  will 
pursue  new  and  more  comprehensive 
approaches  in  which  diplomacy, 
development and security are included in 
an  overall  context  and  topics  such  as 
climate change are included, continues to 
be an unanswered question. 
 
At the moment all that remains is the hope 
that  the  EEAS  will  have  the  effect  of  a 
large  socialization  structure.  Since 
Commission  civil  servants,  Council  civil 
servants  and  national  diplomats  will  be 
forced to work together under one roof in 
the EEAS, the differences which are still so 
noticeable  today,  and  the  question  of 
where someone comes from and to whom 
he has to be loyal, may in the long term be 
overcome  to  make  way  for  a  European 
esprit  de  corps.  It  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  the  Europeans  still  have  enough 
time for this to happen. 
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